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The Job Creation and Worker Assistance Act of 2002,' signed into law by
President Bush on March 9th, extends the Work Opp01tunity Tax Credit
(WOTC)' and the Welfare-to-Work Tax Credit (WtW)' for two more years.
The credits provide employers with tax
incentives to hire former long-term welfare recipients and certain other economically disadvantaged workers, a goal
that comports with the welfare-to-work
The Work Opportunity
focus of welfare reform legislation
Tax Credit and the Welfareadopted by Congress in 1996.' This article describes these employer tax credits, to-Work Tax Credit provide
explains how they have evolved from
employers with tax incentives
prior versions of similar targeted tax
credits, and considers their operation as to hire former long-term
tax-delivered subsidies.
welfare recipients and certain
The WOTC, enacted in 1996,' targets
eight categories of difficult-to-place
other economically disadvanworkers, including families eligible to
taged workers.
receive welfare benefits, ex-felons,
vocational rehabilitation referrals) food
stamp recipients, qualified veterans, SSI
recipients, and high risk or summer youths living in an empowerment zone)
enterprise com1nunity or a renewal community. 6
The WtW tax credit, enacted in 1997,7 1nore narrowly targets workers who
have received welfare benefits during the previous two-year period. 8
Employers receive a tax credit for hiring former welfare recipients who have
left welfare for work under time limits established by welfare reform legislation.
The WOTC and the WtW tax credit, like their predecessors the Targeted
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Jobs Tax Credit and the former credit for welfarerelated Work Incentive (WIN) Program expenses,
have periodically expired and been extended by
Congress, sometimes retroactively. They most
recently expired on December 31, 2001. The extension under the legislation enacted last March is
effective retroactively for individuals who begin
work for employers after December 31, 2001 and
before January 1, 2004. Legislation (H.R. 4626),
passed by the House in May, is currently pending
in the Senate to combine the two credits into one
modified credit for workers from nine targeted categories (the current eight WOTC categories, slightly
more broadly defined, plus a ninth category containing a modified version of the current WtW tax
credit).
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Some History
Although modified somewhat from the design of
their sharply criticized predecessors, the WOTC and
WtW Tax Credit share essential similarities with the
prior tax credits. They provide time-limited employer wage subsidies for certain low-wage or difficultto-place workers. 9
As noted above, the WOTC
replaced the Targeted Jobs
Tax Credit, which was enacted in 1978, and periodically
lapsed and renewed until it
WOTC and the
was finally allowed to expire
in 1994. w The Targeted Jobs
WIW tax credit
Tax Credit (TJTC) replaced the Iii Within the
New Jobs Credit, which was
enacted in 1977, and allowed President's (and
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to expire in 1978. u The WtW
Congressional)
Tax Credit descends from a
political prioriformer tax credit, terminated
in the early eighties, for
lies in "ending
wages paid welfare recipients
welfare" under
under the WIN program.
Congress established WIN in
the welfare leg1967" and modified it during
islalion signed
the early seventies -to place
certain welfare recipients in
in 1996.
jobs. 13 For the ten-year period
from 1972 through 1981, the
WIN-welfare recipient tax credit allowed an
employer a tax credit for wages paid to eligible
employees up to specified percentages of their
compensation during the first two years of employment." After 1981, Congress included the WIN tax
credit in modified form as part of the 1JTC. Thus,
in their various permutations, these kinds of
employment tax credits have been in existence for
thirty years.
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The Current Credits
The Clinton administration pushed for the WOTC and
the WtW tax credit as a way of buttressing efforts to
move welfare recipients into jobs. They fit within the
President's (and Congressional) political priorities in
"ending welfare" under the welfare legislation signed in
1996. In justifying its proposals, the administration's
analysis directly addressed and responded to some of
the criticism of past programs. Two of the major criticisms of the T]TC, the predecessor of WOTC, were 1)
that the credit resulted in windfall gains for employers
because they were subsidized for doing what they
would have done anyway
in the absence of the program (employ low-wage,
low-skilled workers in
high-turnover labor-intensive businesses), 15 and 2)
that it provided little or no
improvement in the longterm job prospects of the
covered workers. 16
Some aspects of the
WOTC and WtW tax credit were explicitly designed
to mitigate those criticisms, including the reformulation of some target
groups, the modification of the certification process,
the lengthening of the minimum employment periods
for maximum credit receipt, and the increase in the
subsidy amount to offset expected employer reluctance
to hire long-term welfare recipients. 17
Congressional Committee reports explained the modifications adopted in WOTC, and noted the temporary
nature of the credit as follows:
The bill creates a new program whose design
will focus on individuals with poor workplace
attachments, streamline administrative burdens,
promote longer-term employment, and thereby
reduce costs relative to the prior-law progran1.
The Committee intends that this short-term
program will provide the Congress and the
Treasury and Labor Departments an opportunity to assess full the operation and effectiveness
of the new credit as a hiring incentive. 111

minimum employment period required before
an employer becomes eligible for the credit
will promote longer, more meaningful work
experiences for those hired. 19
In addition, administration officials suggested that
combining targeted wage subsidies with a consteHation
of other job retention services such as child care and
transportation would improve their effectiveness.w
There is some academic support for this view. For
example, a study of the T]TC concluded that it may
have "modestly improved
the employment rates of
economically disadvantaged youth," and that
although "information/
stigma problems" appear
to limit the effectiveness
of stand-alone targeted
wage subsidies, wage
subsidies for less skilled
workers such as welfare
recipients "are likely to
be more effective when
utilized in conjunction
with labor market intermediaries that help provide some training, placement services, and job retention assistance. "21
Other criticistns of the TJTC were not addressed in
the new proposals 22 by virtue of their design as targeted or selective hiring credits rather than as general job
credits. 2·1 These included problems of low-income
worker displacement (r~placing ineligible workers with
workers eligible for the credits) or discrimination
against members of the targeted groups. 24
The Work Opportunity Tax Credit (WOTC)

The WOTC is intended "to provjde an important
incentive for employers to undertake the expense of
providing jobs and training to economically disadvantaged individuals, many of whom are underskilled
and/or undereducated." 25 It provides a credit of 40 percent of the first $6,000 of qualified first year wages" to
an employee who completes at least 400 hours of service for the employer, with a lesser percentage applicable for fewer hours of service. 27 The 1naximum credit
for each targeted employee is $2,400 (40 percent of
$6,000).'" The WOTC is structured as part of the general business credit. 29 A number of credits are combined
into the general business credit for the purpose of
computing how much of each credit will be allowed in
a given year and in carryback and carryover years. 30
•
Each individual employee must be certified by the
"designated local agency" 31 to be a member of one of
the eligible targeted groups. The employer must
receive the certification from the designated local

In signing the legislation establishing WOTC,
President Clinton emphasized that the bill responded to
concerns about the TJTC:
. the Act provides a significant incentive for
employers to hire people from certain targeted
groups most in need of jobs, such as high-risk
youth. I am pleased to see improvements that
address many of the concerns raised about
implementation of the TJTC. For example, the

Continued on page 4
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:,'i,;l!gency by the time the employee begins work, or it
:,_·:-~ID.-ust complete a "pre-screening notice" not later than

the day the employee is offered employment. The "prescreening notice," Form 8850, signed by both the
employer and the employee, must be submitted to the
agency within 21 days after
the employee begins work as
part of a written request for
certification from the
agency ..1 2
credit is intended 111 Certain limitations on the
availability of the credit
"ease the transition restrict its nonbusiness use.
The credit cannot be used for
from welfare 111
wages paid to an e1nployee
work for the tarwho is related to or a dependent
of the employer or to
geted categories
an individual who is more
111 individuals bl/
than 50 percent owner of the
33
increasing access business. At least half of the
employee's work must be in
111 em111011menl."
the e1nployer's trade or business. Y4
If the employer previously
employed the employee at any time prior to the hiring
date, then the employee's wage's may not be taken into
account for purposes of con1puting the credit. 35 Other
limitations respond to concerns about interactions with
other federally-financed training and other subsidy programs,36 with hiring replacements during labor
disputes, 17 and with preventing circumvention by
employers of the credit wage ceiling and other limitations on the availability of the credit. 38 No credit is generally allowed to tax-exempt organizations. 39
Welfru·e-to-Work Tax Credit (WtW)
The WtW40 tax credit is intended to "ease the transition from welfare to work for the targeted categories of
individuals by increasing access to employ1nent. "41 It
provides a credit amount of 35 percent of the first
$10,000 of "qualified first-year wages" and 50 percent
of the first $10,000 of "qualified second-year wages.""
Employers thus may be eligible for a maximum credit
per qualified employee of $8500 over a two-year period, beginning with the employee's first day of work."
Wages are "qualified" if paid to employees who are
"long-term family assistance recipients. "44 Eligible wages
include cash wages paid to an employee plus amounts
paid by the employer for certain health plan coverage,"
educational assistance, 46 and dependent care assistance47
for the employee.
Each individual employee must be certified by the
designated local agency" as coming within one of the
three targeted categories of "long-term family assistance
recipients," under rules similar to those that apply to
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the WOTC." The categories generally include members
of families 1) receiving temporary assistance to needy
families (TANF, the successor program to AFDC) for at
least 18 consecutive months ending on the hiring
date; 50 2) receiving such assistance for a total of 18
months (whether or not consecutive) beginning after
the credit's enactment date (August 5, 1997) if they are
hired within 2 years after the date that the 18-montb
total is reached;" or 3) ceasing to be eligible for such
assistance by reason of any time limits imposed by
state or federal law, and having a hiring date not more
than two years after the cut-off of assistance. 52
The WtW tax credit is coordinated with the WOTC"
anq cross references numerous definitions and other
limitations from the WOTC.'" Each year, the employer
n1ay choose the credit that provides the greater tax
benefit. 55 For example, if the WOTC is selected for a
taxable year, the WtW tax credit may be chosen by the
employer for the following taxable year if the covered
period from the work beginning date for first-year or
second-year wages has not yet been completed. 56

Tax-Delivered Emplovmenl Subsidies: Advantages
and Disadvantages
As part of its policy deliberations, Congress should
assess the advantages and disadvantages of using the
tax system as a delivery
mechanism for einployn1ent
subsidies compared to providing them through a program of direct grants. That
Business
type of assessment generally
owners ma11 be more
has not been a pa1t of
Congressional deliberations, likel11 to 11artici11ate
however. Under current
in a lax credit propolitical conditions,
Congressional budget rules
gram that reduces
have played a large role in
!heir tax 1,a11mt11 than
the continued use of tax
credits as expiring proviin a "government
sions.
subsidy" program 111
A tax-delivered benefit
does not permit the same
hire certain workers.
degree of agency discretion
or supervision, for example,
as a direct grant progra1n. In addition, it makes the
inco1ne tax code more complex and difficult to
administer.
On the other hand, the tax system may provide some
advantages as a delivery mechanism for an employment subsidy, particularly if a large number of the
employers are small to 1nid-sized businesses. 57
Businesses file income tax returns on an annual basis
and smaller businesses generally may be more accustomed with the tax system than with special employment programs offered by the Department of Labor
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WIW Tax Credits:

attributable to the WIN credit was $60 million in fiscal
year 1981."

continued fro1n page 4

other governtnent agencies. rrhe adn1inistrative costs
Utilization of Current Credits
may thus be lower. In addition, business owners n1ay
be 1nore likely to participate in a tax credit program
Available information on the WtW tax credit and the
that reduces their tax liability than in a "governtnent
WOTC suggests that utilization rates under the most
subsidy" program to hire certain workers. These factors
recent version of these employment tax credits may be
might justify using the tax systen1 as a 1neans of delivsin1ilar. In fiscal year 2001, 438,604 WOTC certifications
ering the subsidy to e1nployers rather than using a
were issued and 97,072 WtW certifications, for a total
grant progra1n to provide either workers or their
of 535,676 certifications.'"
employers with wage subsidies. In addition, past pracIn fiscal year 1999, state employment security agentice and fan1iliarity may argue for not changing the
cies issued 335, 707 WOTC certifications to employers
delivery mechanism that has been used in the past. 58
and 104,998 WtW certifications; corporate employers
1~he predecessor proclaimed about $138 milgrams of WOTC and WtW
lion in WOTC credits on
tax credit were criticized
1997 tax returns and inclias being ineffective.
viduals claimed $15 milAlthough some of the
lion on 1997 returns." The
same criticisn1s apply to
WOTC employers who
the WOTC and WtW tax
earned most of the credits
credit programs given the
( 66 percent) were large
111 be lliohesl among larger lmsinesses,
similarity in design, it is
companies with gross
still early to tell whether
suggeslin!l lhal lhe advantage of using the
receipts of $1 billion or
these progra1ns will suffer
n1ore, and were engaged
system 111 reach small and mid-sized
fron1 the same deficienin "nonfinancial services,
cies. Preli1ninary infonnasuch as hotel, motel, and
tion gives ca use for conother personal services,
cern. Historically, e1nployand retail trade. "66 In an
n1ent tax credits have sufanalysis of state agenc.y
fered a track record of poor pa1ticipation rates.
data from California and Texas for 1997 through 1999,
Experience under the nlodified credits has been sin1ilar,
the U.S. Genera\ Accounting Office (GAO) found that
with poor utilization rates by sn1all and mid-sized
about 3 percent of participating employers accounted
e1nployers.
for about 83 percent of all hires of WOTC-certified
employees. 67
Utillzatio11 of Former Credits
Preliminary data from etnpowern1ent zones also
show
that utilization of empowerment zone e1nploy'fhe New Jobs 'fax Credit provided subsidies for an
1nent tax credits tends to be highest ainong larger busiestimated 1.1 million employees in 1977, and 2.15 milnesses, suggesting that the advantage of using the tax
lion in 1978." The Targeted Jobs Tax Credit covered a
system
to reach small and mid-sized businesses n1ay be
peak of 622,000 workers in 1985 (approximately 0.1
overstated. A GAO survey of the utilization of employpercent of private employment) and then declined to
ment tax credits (including the empowennent zone
364,000 in 1992, with revenue losses of about $500 milemployment credit, the work opportunity credit, and
lion (in 1991 dollars) in the mid-eighties, declining to
the welfare-to-work credit) and other tax incentives in
$245 inillion in 1991.r,n Under the WIN tax credit pronine etnpowerment zones found that large businesses
gra1n, which had low utilization rates, "no more than
20 percent of the WIN individuals known to have
(50 or more employees) had the greatest utilization
entered employn1ent during the year were ever claimed
rates. 68 The GAO su1veyed 2400 business and received
61
by firms as tax credits." According to a study done in
responses from 48 percent of the large urban businessthe seventies, the WIN tax credit was paid on only
es, 32 percent of the small urban businesses, and 46
88,000 workers in fiscal 1973-75 out of 515,000 WIN
percent of the rural businesses. Of those responding,
enrollees who entered the labor 1narket in that period.
the empowerment zone employment credit was used
About $9 million was credited against taxes in fiscal
by 42 percent of large urban businesses, an estimated 6
1973, although part of the credit was for jobs that were
percent of small urban businesses, and 32 percent of
later decertified because the employees were not
rural businesses. Among 1ural businesses, about tworetained for the required period of time." In 1980, WIN
thirds of the large businesses and about one-third of
tax credits were claimed for less than 1o percent of all
the small businesses reported using the credit. Large
new WIN registrants, and the annual revenue loss
urban businesses and rural businesses reported claim-

U1mzalion of empowerment
z1111e em11loyme1111ax credits tends

lax
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ing $9.1 million for tax year 1997. Most empowerment
zone businesses did not use the WOTC or the WtW tax
credit (tax year 1997); however, those that did tended
to be large businesses. Specifically, 11 percent of the
large urban businesses and 14 percent of the large rural
businesses used the WOTC as compared with an estimated 1 percent of the small urban businesses and 3
percent of the small rural businesses. By contrast, 3
percent of the large urban businesses, no small urban
businesses, and 1 percent of the rural businesses used
the WtW tax credit. 69
A study of data on the use of the federal empower·
ment zone employment credit, based on 1996 tax
returns, confirms those general trends. It reported a
total of 1,254 taxpayers with such credits taken against
regular tax liability comprised of 1,040 individuals
(including sole proprietors, partners, S corporation
shareholders, beneficiaries of estates and trusts, and
cooperative patrons) and 214 taxable corporations. 70 In
total, about $15.11 million of credits were claimed,
about $9.59 million by individuals and $5.52 million by
taxable corporations. On the corporate side, larger
businesses made up a smaller percentage of businesses
claiming the credit, but accounted for a larger proportion of the credit claimed. About 72 percent of the
credit was claimed by
the 27 percent of taxpa11·
ers with assets over $10
million. 11 Possible explanations identified for the
low credit usage in
empowerment zones
included the general
problem with using nonrefundable tax credits to
benefit businesses and
individuals in economically distressed areas
whose tax liability may
already be small."
Given the role of the
employment security
agencies in the certification process, the administrative costs generated
by that participation,"
and large businesses'
greater past utilization of
employment credits,
these tax credit programs could be replaced by direct grant programs with·
out loss of advantages provided by a tax-delivered pro·
gram. However, past history with predecessor credits
indicates that it would be unlikely for Congress to sub·
stitute appropriations for existing WOTC or WtW tax
credits.
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Conclusion
The recent extension of the WOTC and WtW tax
credit provides employers with two more years of tax
incentives to hire certain difficult-to-place workers and
former welfare recipients. Preliminaiy information gives
cause for concern about the credits' low utilization
rates and raises questions about whether the credits
make a long·term difference in the job prospects of
economically disadvantaged workers. Those issues will
receive greater scrutiny as studies assess the longerterm effects of the modified credits.
The first wave of welfare roll reductions generally
involved easier-to-place workers and took place during
a period of robust employment growth, even for low.
skilled workers. It will be even more important-and
more difficult-in the current economic climate to provide employers with effective incentives to hire workers targeted by the credits. •

Mary L. Heen is a Professor of Law at the University of
Richmond. Copyright (c) 2002 by Mary L. Heen. Thanks
to Harry Carawan, a recently graduated Richmond law
student, for his assistance this past spring in updating
the research for this article, and to the University of
Richmond's Hunton and Williams Summer Research
Fund for support during its preparation.
1 Pub. 1. No. 107-147, §§ 604, 605, 116 Stat. 21.
2 I.RC. § 51.
3 I.RC. § 51A.
4 Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act of
1996, Pub. 1. No. 104-193, § 103, 110 Stat. 2105, 2112-13, 2137
(repealing the individual entitlement to welfare and imposing a twenty-four month limit on welfare benefits without work and a sixty
month lifetime cap on benefits).
5 The Work Opportunity Tax Credit, enacted by the Small Business
Job Protection Act of 1996, replaced the targeted jobs tax credit. Pub.
1. No. 104-188, § 1201, 110 Stat. 1755, 1768-72 (applying to individuals who begin work for the employer after September 30, 1996 and
before October 1, 1997). The WOTC has been extended by Congress
four times since then.
6 I.R.C. § Sl(d)(defining eight targeted groups). A "high risk youth" is
an 18-24 year old resident of an e1npowerment zone (EZ), enterprise
community (EC), or renewal community (RC). Id. at§ 51(d)(5). A
"qualified summer youth employee" is a 16-17 year old EZ, EC, or RC
resident who performs se1vices for an employer between May 1 and
September 15. Id. at§ 51(d)(7).
7 The Welfare to Work Tax Credit was enacted by the Taxpayer
Relief Act of 1997, Pub. L. No. 105-34, § 801(a), 111 Stat 788, 869-71
(applying to individuals who begin work for the employer after
December 31, 1997 and before May 1, 1999). The WtW tax credit has
been extended by Congress three times since then.
8 The credits do not provide duplicate benefits. If an employer
receives a WtW tax credit for an employee for a particular taxable
year, no WOTC credit may be taken for the employee for that year.
See I.R.C. §51A(e).
9 This analysis focuses on the WOTC and the WtW tax credit, and
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-c _:draws from Mary L. He en, Reinventing Tax Expenditure Reform:
---- Jmj>roving Program Oversight Under the Government Pelformance
and Results Act, 35 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 751, 798-817 (2000).

Other employer tax credits provide targeted wage subsidies for more
geographically restricted worker populations, including the
Empowerment Zone Employment Credit, LR.C. § 1396, the Indian
employment credit, LR.C. § 45A (currently scheduled to expire after
December 31, 2004, see I.R.C. § 45A(t)), and the newly effective
renewal conlffiunity employment credit, I.R.C. § 1400H (treating certain "renewal communities" as if they were empowerment zones for
purposes of a modified employment credit). See Joint Committee on
Taxation, Description of Present Law Regarding Tax Incentives/or

Renewal Communities and Other Economically Distressed Areas (JCX40-02), May 20, 2002; see generally BORIS I. BITIKER & LAWRENCE
LoKKF.i'I, FEDERAL TAXATION OF INCOME, ESTATES AND GIFTS, 9f 27.3.3, at
27-39 and 27-40 (3d ed. 1999)(describing employ1nent credits). The
Empowerment Zone Employment Credit provides a credit for portions of wages of employees who live and work in "empowerment
zones," areas designated by the Secretary of Housing and Urban
Development (urban areas) or the Secretary of Agriculture (rural
areas) to have high levels of poverty, unemployment, and distress,
and which meet certain other requirements. See I.R.C. §§ 1391, 1392;
see generally, e.g., EZ Gazette CEZ project web site),
http://wvvw.richmond.edu/-ezproj/ (for resources and links to other
web sites).
10 Revenue Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-600, § 321, § 554, 92 Stat.
2763, 2830, 2892 (enacting the targeted jobs tax credit and requiring
the Secretaries of Labor and the Treasury to report to Congress by
June 30, 1981, on its effectiveness in improving e1nploy1nent of the
targeted groups). The 1JTC was extended by Congress in 1981, 1982,
1984, 1986, 1988, 1989, 1990, and in 1991. In 1993, the targeted jobs
tax credit was retroactively renewed after expiring again on June 30,
1992, and was extended through December 31, 1994.
11 Tax Reduction and Simplification Act of 1977, Pub. L. No. 95-30,
91 Stat. 126. See H.R. CoNF. REP. No. 95-263, at 291-92 (describlng the
new jobs credit, adopted in 1977, of 50 percent of the increase in
each employer's une1nployment insurance wage base above 102 percent of that wage base in the previous year, as limited by various
caps, and an additional credit equal to 10 percent of the first $4,200
of unemployment insurance wages paid to handicapped individuals,
including handicapped veterans, who receive vocational rehabilitation).
12 Pub. L. No. 90-248, Title II, Part 1, § 204, 81 Stat. 884.
13 The WIN program was replaced by the JOBS program, enacted as
part of the revision of the AFDC progra1n by the Family Support Act
of 1988 to assist parents in ohtaining education, training, and
employment needed to avoid long-term welfare dependence. See
H.R. CONF. REr. No. 100-998, at 1 (1988). The JOBS progra1n was
eliminated in 1996, along with the federal entitlement to welfare.
14 Former I.R.C. §§ 40, 50A, SOB.

on Select Revenue Measures of the Comm. on Ways and Means, 103d
Cong. 76 (1994)(testimony of Robert B. Reich, Secretary, U.S. Dept.
of labor, stating that "the Ad~istration has not sought an extension
of TJTC in its present form" and summarizing the results of fourteen
studies of the program over fifteen years); OFFICE OF INSPECTOR
GENERAL, U.S. DEPT. OF LABOR, TARGETED ]OBS TAX CREDIT PROGRAM:
EMPLOYMENT INDUCEMENT OR EMPLOYER WINDFALL? 16-32 (Aug. 1994)(recon1filending after an audit of program year 1991 that the TJTC be discontinued after its expiration); see also U.S. DEPTS. OF LABon AND
TREASURY, T!IE USE OF TAX SUBSIDIES FOR EMPLOYMENT 4-7 (1986)(evaluating the New Jobs Tax Credit and the initial TJTC in effect from 197981)[hereinafter 1986 TREASURY EMPLOYMENT SUBSIDIES REPORT].
17 CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCf-1 SERVICE, EMPWYMENT TAX CREDITS EXl'llt!NG
DUR!NG THE 106™ CONGRESS, updated Dec. 21, 1999, reprinted in CRS
Reports on Welfare-to-Work and Work Opportunity Tax Credits (Doc.
2000-828, Release Date: Jan. 04, 2000), 2000 TNT 3-27 Qan. 5,
2000)[hereinafter CRS EMPLOYMENT TAX CREDIT REPORT]; JOINT ECONOMIC
COMMITTEE, U.S. CONGRESS, THE WELFARE-TO-WORK TAX CREDIT 6-9 (Mar.
1997)(responding to the administration's analysis of proposed
changes)[hereinafter JOINT ECONOMIC COMM. WWTC REPORT]. See also
Anne L. Alstott, Work v. Freedom: A Liberal Challenge to Employment
Subsidies, 108 YALE L.J 967, 1036-38 (1999)(discussing the specific
changes from prior law and noting some additional problems created
by the changes).
18 S. REP. NO. 104-281, at 32, reprinted in 1996 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1474,
1506. See also H.R. CoNF. REP. No. 104-737, at 205-07, reprinted in
1996 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1677, 1697-99 (generally following the Senate
amendment).
19 Statement by President \Villia1n]. Clinton upon Signing H.R. 3448,
32 WEEKLY COMP. PRES. Doc. 1475 (Aug. 26, 1996), reprinted in 1996
U.S.C.C.A.N. 1862, 1863.
20 Robert Pear, Clinton Will Seek Tax Break to h'ase Path Off Welfare,
N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 28, 1997, at Al (quoting senior advisers to President
Clinton for the Administration's view that the new tax credit would
be more effective than earlier versions as "just one piece of an overall strategy to make work more attractive than welfare," with other
elements including "child care, an increase in the minimum wage,
health insurance for people leaving welfare and transportation to
help people get to their jobs").
21 E.g. Lawrence F. Katz, Wage Subsidies/or the Disadvantaged in
GENERATING ]OBS 21, 23, 46, 48--49 (eds. Richard B. Freeman & Peter
Gottschalk, 1998); see also Frederick J. Tanne1y, Targeted jobs Tax
Credits and Labor Market Experience, University of Pittsburgh, available from Employment Policies Institute, Washington, D.C., at
http://www.epionline.org (1998)(finding positive wage effects from
the 1JTC for disadvantaged youth and female welfare recipients in a
long-term analysis of 17,000 Pennsylvania workers).
22 ]O!NT ECONOMIC COMMITTEE, U.S. CONGRESS, THE WELFAfil:-TO-WORK
TAX CREDIT, Executive Summary (Mar. 1997)(concluding that "it is
unlikely that the proposed differences between the Welfare-to-Work
Tax Credit and its predecessor will effectively address the shortcomings of the earlier plan" and that "the proposed plan may create
other problems and inefficiencies which are common to targeted tax
credits of its kind").

15 Large employers in the restaurant, retail, hotel, nursing ho1ne, and
chicken processing industries, as well as management assistance and
consulting firms that helped those businesses with the necessary certifications and filings, were viewed as important lobbying forces in
keeping the TJTC alive from 1978 to 1994. See, e.g., Elizabeth
Garrett, Harnessing Politics: Tbe Dynamics of Qffeet Requirements in
the Tax Legislattve Process, 65 U. C1rr. L. REY. 501, 521-22 (1998). They
have also been major sources of lobbying pressure in favor of the
WOTC.

23 The former New jobs Credit, discussed above, was designed as an
incremental credit tied to a general increase in the employer's workforce. In contrast, the 1JTC, which was a targeted or categorical hiring subsidy, was designed to provide an incentive for employers to
hire from certain low-skilled, hard-to-place groups.

16 See, e.g., Targeted jobs Tax Credit: Hearing Before the Subcomm.

Working Poor: Proposals to Reform the Earned Income Tax Credit
Program, 11 AM.]. TAX PoL'Y 225, 291-93 (1994).
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25 s. REP No. 104-281, at 32, reprinted in 1996 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1474,
1506; H.R. CoNF. REP. No. 104-737, at 205-07, reprinted in 1996
U.S.C.C.A.N. 1677, 1697-99 (generally following the Senate amendment).
26 Wages are defined as under the Federal Unemployment Tax Act
(FUTA). l.R.C. § 51(c)(1) (referring to§ 3306(b)). As with the WtW tax
credit, "qualified first-year wages" means wages attributable to services "rendered during the 1-year period beginning with the day the
individual begins work for the employer." I.R.C. § 51(b)(2).
27 I.R.C. §§ 51(a), (b), 0)(3). The credit percentage is reduced to 25
percent of those wages for employees who perform at least 120
hours, but less than 400 hours, of service for the employer. I.R.C. §
510)(3)(A). No wages are taken into account unless the employee
has performed at least 120 hours of service for the employer. I.R.C. §
51(i)(3)(B).

28 No deduction is allowed for the employee's wages to the extent
of the amount of the credit l.R.C. § 280C(a). This limitation also
applies to the WtW tax credit. I.R.C. § 51A(d)(2). This prevents the
combination of !he wage deduction and the credit from providing a
tax benefit in excess of the amount of wages actually paid, and is
similar in effect to making the tax credit taxable. See STANLEY S.
SURREY & PAUL R. McDANIEL, TAX EXPENDITURES 41, 111 (1985). For
example, for each eligible worker, a corporate employer in the 35°/o
tax bracket would gain a maximum $2,400 credit and would lose a
deduction of $2400, worth $840 (35% x $2,400) to that employer. See
1.R.C. § 280C(a).
29 See 1.R.C. §§ 51(a) and 38(b)(2).
30 See 1.R.C. §§ 38(c),(d); 39.

31 LR.C. § 51(d)(ll)(a state employment security agency).
32 I.R.C. § 51(d)(12)(A). If a certificate is later detennined to be
incorrect due to false information provided by the employee, the
agency must revoke the certificate, and wages paid after the employer receives notice of revocation are not qualified wages. I.R.C. §
51(d)(12)(B). If the agency denies a request for certification, it must
provide a written explanation of the reasons for denying the request.
l.R.C. § 51(d)(12)(C).

33 I.R.C. § 510). This limitation also applies to the WtW tax credit.
I.R.C. § 51A(d)(l)(cross referencing§ 51(i)).
34 LR.C. § 5l(f). This limitation also applies to the WtW tax credit.
LR.C. § 51A(d)(l)(cross referencing§ 5l(f)).
35 LR.C. § 510)(2)(as amended by Pub. L. No. 106-170, § 505(b), 113
Stat. 1860, by striking "during which he was not a member of a targeted group" after "at any time.").
36 No credit is available for wages for any period during which the
employer receives federally funded payn1ents for on-the-job training
for the employee. I.R.C. § 5l(c)(2)(A). Wages otherwise eligible for
the credit are reduced by the amount of work supplementation payments received by the employer under the Social Security Act with
respect to the employee. I.R.C. § 51(c)(2)(B).
37 I.R.C. § 51(c)(3)(wages paid to employees hired to work at a plant
or facility of the employer during a period when a strike or lockout
involves the employees at the plant or facility are not eligible for the
credit if they are paid for services "substantially similar to" those performed by employees "participating in, or affected by," the strike or
lockout).
38 I.R.C. § 52 (providing that all members of a controlled group of
corporations are treated as a single employer and that the WOTC
credit with respect to each member shall be its proportionate share
of the '\Vages giving rise to the credit, and providing similar rules for

The Communlly Tax Law Report

unincorporated businesses under common control). Similar rules
apply to the WtW tax credit. l.R.C. § 51A(d)(l)(crossferencing LR.C. §
52).

39 1.R.C. § 52(c)(other than cooperatives described in I.R.C. § 521).
See also I.R.C. § 51A(d)(l)(applicable also to WtW tax credit).
40 Like the WOTC, the WtW tax credit is structured as part of the
general business credit. See LR.C. §§ 51A(d)(2) and 38(b)(2).
41 H.R. CONF. REP. No. 105-148, at 383, reprinted in 1997 U.S.C.C.A.N.
678, 777 ("It is also intended to provide certain e1nployee benefits to
these individuals to encourage training, health coverage, dependent
care and ultimately better job attachment."); see also H.R. CoNP. REP.
No. 105-220, at 440-41, reprinted in 1997 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1129, 1252-53
(following the House bill); Statement of President William]. Clinton
Upon Signing H.R. 2014, 33 WEEKLEY COMP. PRES. Doc. 1192 (Aug: 11,
1997), reprinted in 1997 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1620-1, 1620-3 ("I am pleased
that H.R. 2014 includes a modified version of my welfare-to-\vork tax
credit proposal, which is designed to generate new job opportunities
for long-term welfare recipients.").
42 1.R.C. § 51A(a).
43 1.R.C. § 51A(b)(2),(3).
44 1.R.C. § 51A(b)(l).

45 l.R.C. § 51A(b)(5)(B)(i), (ii)(covering the reasonable cost of coverage for the period, but not more than the applicable premium
defined under I.RC. § 4980B(f)(4)).
46 LR.C. § 51A(b)(5)(B)0ii)(relating to educational assistance excludable from gross income under I.R.C. § 127).
47 LR.C. § 51A(b)(5)(B)(iv)(relating to dependent care assistance programs under I.R.C. § 127).
48 LR.C. § 51A(c)(l)(defined by reference to §51(d)(ll) as a state
employment security agency).
49 1.R.C. § 51A(d)(l).
50 1.R.C. § 51A(c)(l)(A).
SI l.R.C. § SIA(c)(l)(B).
52 l.R.C. § 51A(c)(l)(C).

53 LR.C. § 51A(e)(providing that if a WtW tax credit is allowed to an
etnployer with respect to an individual employee for the taxable
year, then the employee cannot be treated ·as a member of a targeted
group for purposes of the \VOTC credit for the taxable year).
54 See 1.R.C. §§ 51A(b)(5)(A), (C), (c)(l),(2), (d). Like tbe WOTC, the

WtW tax credit is also coordinated with the empowerment zone
employment credit. LR.C. §§ 51A(d)(2), 1396(c)(3)(providing that the
same wages cannot be taken into account' for multiple credits and
that the $15,000 per calendar year per worker limit of wages to be
taken into account for purposes of the empowerment zone employment credit is reduced by the wages taken into account for the calendar year in determining the WtW tax credit or the WOTC credit).
For a description of the empowennent zone employment credit, see
supra note 9.
55 See I.R.C. §§ 51(j), 51A(d)(l)(employer may elect out of having the
credit apply for any taxable year). The election may be make (or
revoked) at any time before the expiration of the 3-year period
beginning on the last date for filing the return for the taxable year
(without regard to extensioIL<i). Id.
56 See IRS Notice 97-54, 1997-2 C.B. 306 (providing examples); see
also IRS Notice 99-51, 1999-40 LR.B. 447 (describing the oper.J.tion of
the credits when an individual is employed by more than one
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employer in the process of moving from welfare to work).

STRATEGIES FOR REACHING
THE WELFARE-TO-WORK
POPULATION

57 Edward.A. Zelinsky, Efficiency and Income Taxes: 1be
Rehabilitation of Tax Incentives, 64 TEx. L. REV. 973, 1033-35 (1986).
58 Id. at 1034.

59 See, e.g., Katz, supra note 21, at 30; see generally 1986 TREASURY
EMPLOYMENT SUBSIDIES REPORT, supra note 16, at 5 (estimating the total
budgetary cost of the two-year NJTC as $9.7 billion).

bv Vaughn E. James

60 Katz, id. at 32-33.

In the book of Matthew, the Bible tells an interesting
story of a king who hosted a marriage feast for his
son.' The king invited several guests to the feast. Alas,
when the great day arrived, the guests refused to come!
One by one, they made excuses, choosing to engage in
other activities rather than attend the reception. One
went off to his farm, another to his place of business;
others seized the servants whom the monarch had sent
to escort them to the feast, treated them shamefully,
and killed them. In the end, the king had a second
group of servants fan out throughout the city inviting
everyone they met to the wedding reception. By the
time the feast started, the
hall was filled with all
sorts of people - in
today's parlance, rich and
Contrarvto
poor, black and white,
Asians and Latinos, men
reports that workfare and wo1nen.
is bringing tremendous This Biblical parable of
marriage feast conreliel, new work ethics the
tains some interesting parand pride to America's allels to the now almost
seven-year-old story of the
poor and underprivi·
welfare-to-work program.
leged, the truth is that When, in 1996, Congress
and President Clinton
several former and
abolished welfare as it
current welfare recipi- was and initiated the welfare-to-work program, 2
ents have not Ileen
they collectively acted like
llenefiling lrom this
the king in the Biblical
parable. They were prollountilul harvest.
viding something they
believed to be of great
benefit to their constituents. Like the Biblical
king, they expected their constituents to readily partake
of this great feast. Confident that they had brought significant, positive change to this country, both Congress
and President Clinton lauded the virtues of the welfareto-workfare program. 3 In fact, President Clinton himself
loudly touted welfare reform as one of the major
achievements of his administration. 4
To get the program going in the right direction, the
government united with business to form the Welfare-

61 Id. at 29.
62 Daniel S. Hamermesh, Subsidies/or jobs in the Private Sector, in
CREATING )OBS: PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT PROGRAMS AND WAGE SUBSWIES

95

Qohn L. Palmer, ed., 1978).
63 See 1986
19.

TREASURY EMPLOYMENT SUl\Sll)JES REPORT,

supra note 16, at

64 See http://workforcesecurity.doleta.gov/employ/updates.asp (modified in April 2002). In Virginia, just over two thousand certifications
per quarter were issued by the state in fiscal year 2001. In fiscal year
2002, quarterly ce1tifications have declined somewhat over last year.
Telephone conversation with Mrs. Jeff Primer, WOTC/Welfare-ToWork Credit Coordinator, Virginia Employment Commission (VEC),
Ridunond, Virginia (May 16, 2002). See generally http://www.vec.
state.va.us/index.cfm (employer services, VEC publications and certification forms)(last visited on May 22, 2002).
65 See CRS EMPLOYMENT TAX Ct{EDJT Rt:l'Olff, supra note 17, at 9T9T 29-

32.
66 See U.S. GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, WORK Ol'l'OlffUNJ'!Y TAX
CREDIT: EMPLOYERS Do NOT APPEAR TO DISMISS EMPLOYEES TO INCUEASE
TAX CnED11'S, GA0-01-329, at 2-3, 8-9 (March 2001)(finding little
churning of employees; "certified workers with earnings within plus
or minus $1,000 of the $6,000 credit maximizing level were no more
likely to separate from their employers than other certified workers").
67 Id. at 2, 10.
68 U.S. GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, IlUSlNESSES' USE OF EMPOWJ<:HMENT
ZONE TAX INCENTlVES, GAO/RCED-99-253, at 2, 6-11 (Sept. 30, 1999).
69 Id. at 18.
70 Edith Bra.shares, Empowerment Zone Tax Incentive Use: ivhat the
1996 Data Indicate, 20 STAT INCOME Buu,, 236, 246 (Summer 2000).
71 Id. at 244, 246.
72 Id. at 237 (also discussing the effects of the credit limitations and
general business credit carryforward rules).
73 Spending for employment security administration of the two programs has been $20 million per fiscal year. CRS EMPLOYMENT TAX
CREDIT REPORT, supra note 17, at 9f33.
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